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The extent to which India’s poor have benefited from 
the country’s economic growth has long been debated. 
This paper revisits the issues using a new series of 
consumption-based poverty measures spanning 50 years, 
and including a 15-year period after economic reforms 
began in earnest in the early 1990s. Growth has tended 
to reduce poverty, including in the post-reform period. 
There is no robust evidence that the responsiveness of 
poverty to growth has increased, or decreased, since 
the reforms began, although there are signs of rising 
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inequality. The impact of growth is higher for poverty 
measures that reflect distribution below the poverty 
line, and it is higher using growth rates calculated from 
household surveys than national accounts. The urban-
rural pattern of growth matters to the pace of poverty 
reduction. However, in marked contrast to the pre-reform 
period, the post-reform process of urban economic 
growth has brought significant gains to the rural poor as 
well as the urban poor.   
Has India’s Economic Growth Become More Pro-Poor  
in the Wake of Economic Reforms? 
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1. Introduction 
India's post-independence planners in the 1950s must surely have expected better 
performance from the new country's economic strategy. Poverty has always figured prominently 
in assessments of India’s economic performance. On average, slightly more than one person in 
two lived below the poverty line in India during the 1950s and ‘60s. By 1990 the proportion had 
fallen, but was still slightly more than one person in three; Figure 1 gives our estimates of the 
poverty rate for the date of each available survey as well as an estimate of the mean poverty rate 
by year.
2 There was no trend increase, or decrease, in consumption inequality over the period up 
to about 1990 (Bruno et al., 1998). So the (proximate) reason why poverty did not fall more 
rapidly was low rates of economic growth; GDP per capita grew at an annual rate of barely 1% 
in the 1960s and 1970s, though picking up to 3% in the 1980s.  
There has been much hope that India’s economic reforms starting in the early 1990s 
would bring more rapid poverty reduction. There has certainly been an acceleration of growth, 
with GDP per capita growing at 4-5% since 1991. However, we also know from past research 
that the sectoral pattern of India’s growth matters to its impact on poverty. The green revolution 
appears to have stimulated pro-poor rural growth.
3 In past work, we found that both the urban 
and rural poor gained from growth within the rural sector, but that urban growth had adverse 
distributional effects within urban areas and no discernable impact on rural poverty (Ravallion 
and Datt, 1996).  The disappointing outcomes for the poor from non-farm growth have also been 
traced back to India’s antecedent socio-economic inequalities in access to schooling.
4 However, 
while past research pointed to the importance of rural economic growth to poverty reduction in 
India, the post-reform process of economic growth has not favored the rural sector. A number of 
observers have pointed to both geographic and sectoral divergence in India’s post-reform growth 
process.
5 We have argued elsewhere that this has meant that much of the non-farm economic 
                                                 
2   The estimates use the data and methods described later; the estimates of the conditional mean by 
year (the bold line in Figure 1) are locally-weighted regression estimates. The mean (and median) poverty 
rate up to 1970 was 53% with a standard deviation of 6.3% 
3    Datt and Ravallion (1998) found that farm productivity growth reduced rural poverty. Earlier 
support for this view includes Ahluwalia (1978, 1985),  van de Walle (1985), Bhattacharya et al. (1991) and 
Bell and Rich (1994). Dissenting views include Saith (1981) and Gaiha (1995). 
4   Ravallion and Datt (2002) found a strong interaction effect between the initial level of human 
development at state level and the non-farm growth rate in determining poverty reduction at state level. 
5   Bhattacharya and Sakthivel (2004), Jha (2000), Datt and Ravallion (2002) and Purfield (2006). 3 
 
growth bypassed the sectors and states where it would have had the most impact on poverty 
based on a model calibrated to largely pre-reform data (Datt and Ravallion, 2002).  By this view, 
the composition of the higher growth would mean that it by-passed many of India’s poor. 
Against this view, it can be conjectured that India’s growth process has changed—
implying a new set of parameters in the relationship between growth and poverty reduction. 
Ravallion and Datt (1996) studied a period in which the development strategy emphasized rapid 
development of the capital goods sector in a largely closed economy.
6  The strategy assumed that 
the capital stock and industrial structure could be manipulated exogenously through central 
planning, even in a largely market-based economy. The strategy was also founded on “trade 
pessimism”—the beliefs, grounded in the experiences of colonialism, that India could never 
compete in global markets until its domestic capital stock had been greatly expanded, coupled 
with a distrust of foreign (Western) countries as a source of essential goods. These assumptions 
were questioned in both academic and policy circles at the time, and with greater veracity as the 
years passed, in the light of the evidently poor economic performance.
7 The success of China’s 
pro-market reforms starting in 1978 also fueled doubts in the 1980s about India’s economic 
strategy. The policy debate raged for many years, but it was not until a balance of payments 
crisis that reforms started in earnest, in the early 1990s. (As is evident in Figure 1, the 
macroeconomic difficulties appear to have also stalled progress against poverty.) Trade 
liberalization was combined with efforts to support higher productivity in the private sector.
8 
Supporters argued that these reforms would allow India to better exploit its comparative 
advantage in labor-intensive goods and services, and that this would directly benefit the poor; by 
this view, the reforms would “..favour the poor by beginning to remove the pervasive bias that 
exists against the employment of unskilled labour” (Joshi and Little, 1996, p.221). The hope was 
that the post-reform urban economy would be more effective in reducing both urban and rural 
poverty.  
                                                 
6   On the history of thought on development strategies and their implications for poverty, with 
specific reference to India, see Lipton and Ravallion (1995).  
7   Some observers in India at the time had questioned these assumptions, raising concerns about 
labor absorption (given high population growth) and (hence) poverty reduction; in particular see Vakil 
and Brahmanand (1956). Chakravarty (1987) provides an insightful account of the history of thought on 
India’s (pre-reform) development strategy. For a broader analysis of industrial policy in developing 
countries, emphasizing the endogeneity of industrial structure to factor endowments, see Lin (2009).  4 
 
However, there are also reasons to question whether the new policy environment would 
succeed in putting India on a new path of rapid poverty reduction. The greater openness to 
external trade came with sufficient productivity growth to assure a higher growth rate of national 
output.
9 But it appears that new inequality-increasing forces also emerged, and a number of 
observers have reported evidence of rising consumption inequality since the early 1990s.
10 This 
may well reflect the antecedent inequalities in other “non-income” dimensions, particularly in 
human capital, which can mean that the poorest are largely left behind; these inequalities were 
far greater in India around 1990 than China around 1980.
11  
Some observers have also questioned whether the post-reform growth process has 
fulfilled the expectations of reform advocates that it would increase aggregate demand for 
unskilled labor and (hence) help reduce poverty. The fastest growing sectors of India’s economy 
have tended to be more intensive in capital and skilled labor, notably the booming business-
services sector. And the share of employment in agriculture has fallen much less than (say) 
China. This pattern of growth is hardly what the “comparative-advantage” arguments of reform 
advocates in the 1980s predicted as the outcome of India becoming a far more open economy.
12 
However, it is also important to note that the non-farm sectors that are relatively intensive in 
unskilled labor—trade, construction and the informal manufacturing sector—fared better in the 
post-1991 period than earlier (Kotwal et al., 2009).
13 The non-farm sector’s aggregate demand 
                                                                                                                                                             
8   On India’s reform agenda since the early 1990s see Ahluwalia (2002) and Panagariya (2008).  
9   See the interesting discussion in Eswaran and Kotwal (1994, Chapter 7) who argue that domestic 
productivity growth is key to the outcomes for poor people from trade openness in India. Here the 
sequencing of reforms was important, and India’s reformers wisely emphasized domestic reforms (such as 
industrial de-licensing) prior to external reforms (Bhagwatti, 1993).   
10   Evidence of rising inequality in India since 1991 is reported in Ravallion (2000), Deaton and 
Drèze (2002) and Sen and Hiamnshu (2004b). 
11   See the discussion in Drèze and Sen (1995) on the constraints stemming from India’s poor human 
development attainments at the outset of its current reform period, and the contrast with China. Also see 
Chaudhuri and Ravallion (2006) on the distinction between “good” and “bad” inequalities in both China 
and India, and the discussion of inequality of opportunity in World Bank (2005).  
12   Few people in the 1980s would have predicted that technological changes in the 1990s, combined 
with the required human skills, would entail that India developed a comparative advantage in sectors such 
as business services. 
13   The formal (“organized”) manufacturing sector has not seen rising employment after trade 
liberalization (Sen, 2009), although this is a moot point given that 80% of manufacturing employment is 
in the informal sector (Kotwal et al., 2009).  5 
 
for unskilled labor appears to have increased after the reforms, even though the most dynamic 
sectors have been intensive in skilled labor.   
Motivated by these observations, this paper addresses the following questions: Have 
India’s higher growth rates since the early 1990s delivered a higher pace of progress against 
absolute poverty? Have we seen any change in the responsiveness of poverty to growth in the 
post-reform period? Has the poverty impact of the urban-rural composition of growth changed? 
In particular, is there any sign that the post-reform urban economic growth process has been 
more pro-poor than the pre-reform process?  
  The following section outlines the concepts and methods used in this study. Section 3 
describes our data set, which updates that we constructed for Ravallion and Datt (1996) (with 
some improvements in the estimation methods, as described below). Section 4 then presents our 
results and discusses their implications.  Section 5 concludes.   
 
2.  Concepts and methods 
  There are two ways in which economic growth can be considered “pro-poor.”
 14 By the 
first, which we label Definition 1, “pro-poor growth” is growth that reduces an agreed measure 
of poverty, and the extent of poverty reduction is then the sole metric of “pro-poorness.”  
Definition 2 says instead that “pro-poor growth” is growth that disproportionately benefits the 
poor when judged relative to the rate of growth; by this view the pro-poorness of growth is 
measured by the elasticity of the agreed poverty measure with respect to economic growth.  
  We use three poverty measures for implementing both definitions: The head-count index 
(H) is given by the percentage of the population who live in households with a consumption per 
capita less than the poverty line. The poverty gap index (PG) is the mean distance below the 
poverty line expressed as a proportion of that line, where the mean is formed over the entire 
population, counting the non-poor as having zero poverty gap; this can be interpreted as a 
measure of the depth of poverty.  The squared poverty gap index (SPG), introduced by Foster et 
al. (1984), is the mean of the squared proportionate poverty gaps.  Unlike PG, SPG is sensitive to 
distribution amongst the poor, in that it satisfies the transfer axiom for poverty measurement 
                                                 
14   For an overview of the various approaches to defining “pro-poor growth” see Ravallion (2004). 6 
 
(Sen, 1976).  SPG can be thought of as a measure of the severity of poverty. All three measures 
are members of the class of measures proposed by Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984): 
   ] 0 , ) / 1 max[(
1 
 z y     
N
=   P it
N
1 = i t
t
t
         ( 1 )  
in which  it y is consumption expenditure of the i'th person at date t in a population of size t N , z is 
the poverty line, and α is a non-negative parameter. It can be seen that H is obtained when α=0, 
PG when α=1, and SPG has α=2. To simplify notation we drop the “α” from now on, but it 
should be recalled that there are three distinct poverty measures.  
  In implementing Definition 2, it is useful to note that virtually all poverty measures found 
in practice can be written as functions of the survey mean relative to the poverty line and the 
relative distribution of income, as represented by the Lorenz curve.
15 When the poverty line is 
fixed in real terms all such poverty measures are strictly decreasing functions of the mean ( t  ) 
for any given relative distribution (though the elasticity can vary greatly, depending on the initial 
mean and Lorenz curve). In the present setting, a higher growth rate may also entail a shift in 
distribution for or against the poor. Here we are interested in the total effect of growth on 
poverty, allowing distribution to change, rather than the partial effect, holding distribution 
constant.











           ( 2 )  
We call   the “growth elasticity of poverty reduction”, or “elasticity” for short.  
We shall estimate   by the regression coefficient of  t P ln  on  t  ln  across the available 
time series, allowing the error term to be autocorrelated and heteroskedastic.
17  Whenever both the 
dependent and independent variable of such a regression are estimated from the same survey 
data the possibility arises of bias due to the fact that measurement errors in the survey can be 
passed onto both variables; when overestimating the mean one will tend to underestimate 
                                                 
15   See, for example, Datt and Ravallion (1992) and Kakwani (1993). 
16   Analytic formulae for the partial elasticities are found in Kakwani (1993). On the conceptual 
distinction between the partial and total elasticities in this context see Ravallion (2007). 
17   A dynamic model (with lags in  t P ln  and  t  ln ) is not feasible given the uneven spacing of the 
time series. However, we have little choice but to assume even spacing when implementing the 
corrections to the standard errors for serial correlation. 7 
 
poverty.  (The sign of the bias is ambiguous in theory given that there is also an attenuation bias 
in the estimate of  .) We shall also use an Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator, in which the 
instruments exclude any variables derived from the same survey as the dependent variable.  
Instrumentation of the survey mean is also helpful for controlling the effect of changes in survey 
design.  
We will also study the urban-rural composition of both growth and poverty reduction. In 
India, as in most other developing countries, the rural sector tends to have higher incidence of 
extreme poverty and accounts for a substantially higher share of absolute poverty than the urban 
sector (Ravallion et al., 2007).  Also in common with most (growing) developing economies, 
India's trend rate of growth has been higher in the non-farm  sectors  than in agriculture.   
  The fortunes of poor people are linked between urban and rural areas. The scope for the 
urban economy to absorb wage labor from rural areas has long been seen as a key factor in 
poverty reduction. Labor mobility can yield an equilibrium relationship between the real wages 
of similar workers, entailing “horizontal integration” in the earnings and income distributions—
the living standards of people in different sectors but at similar levels of living are causally 
related.  Such integration can also arise without labor mobility. Proximity to urban areas 
enhances demand for the outputs of the rural economy.
18 The living standards of households in 
different sectors but sharing similar factor endowments will tend to move together to the extent 
that trade in goods attenuates differences in real factor prices.  The fact that the rural sector 
produces food partly consumed in the urban sector can mean that agricultural growth raises 
urban welfare by lowering food prices (to the extent that domestic food markets are only weakly 
integrated with global markets). Transfer behavior can also produce horizontal integration.  
The existence of such horizontal integration suggests that changes emanating from the 
urban (rural) sector can have powerful effects on levels of living in the rural (urban) sector. This 
can also entail distributional effects, notably when the distributions of absolute levels of living in 
different sectors tend to overlap imperfectly, i.e., they share a positive density over certain 
(compact) intervals of the range of living standards, but not others.  The urban sector of a 
developing country will often include an elite that essentially has no counterpart in the rural 
                                                 
18   Lanjouw and Murgai (2009) and World Bank (2009) argue that India’s urban economic growth 
has exerted a pull on the rural economy through rural nonfarm diversification. 
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sector.  When combined with shared poverty in the overlapping interval of the distribution, this 
can have strong implications for how an increase in incomes in one sector will spill over to affect 
both average levels of living, and inequalities within the other sector. 
We will be interested in the urban-rural decomposition of poverty. On exploiting the fact 
that the average level of poverty at date t can be additively decomposed using population 
weights, we have: 
   rt rt ut ut t P n P n =   P   (t=1,..,T)         ( 3 )  
where  it n  and  it P  are the population shares and poverty measures for sector  r   u,    = i    (for "urban" 
and "rural").  We exploit additivity in testing whether the sectoral composition of growth matters 
by estimating the following regression on the discrete data: 
  ) 2 ( ln ) / ( ln ln ln 1 1 1 1 1 1   T ,.., = t      +   n   n n  s -   s   +   s   +   s   =   P t rt ut rt ut rt n rt rt r ut ut u t      
               (4) 
where   is the discrete-time difference operator,  t it it it / n =   s  
  is sector i’s share of mean 
consumption at date t and it is the mean for sector i.  The  r u   ,  parameters can be interpreted as 
the impact of (share-weighted) growth in the urban and rural sectors respectively, while  n gives 
the effect of the population shift from rural to urban areas—interpretable as a “Kuznets effect” 
following Kuznets (1955).  To motivate this test regression, notice that, under the null hypothesis 
that         = n r u   , equation (4) collapses to:  
   t t t   +      =   P    ln ln           ( 5 )  
Thus, under this null, it is the overall rate of growth that matters, not its composition.  By testing 
that null we can determine whether the composition of growth matters.   
  We also test whether economic growth in one sector affects distribution in the other 
sector.  For this purpose, we estimate the following system (dropping time subscripts for 
brevity):  
u r u r u r u r r u u u u u
P
u +   n   n n s s +    s   +      s =   P s      
    ln ) / ( ln ln ln 3 2 1         (6.1) 
r r u r u r r r r r u u r r
P
r +   n   n n s s +    s   +      s =   P s      
    ln ) / ( ln ln ln 3 2 1         (6.2) 




r   + n n n s s +     s     s   = n   n n s s      
    ln ) / ( ln ln ln ) / ( 3 2 1         (6.3) 
where  t it it
P
it /P P n =   s  and  ni ri ui i        , so that summing (6.1), (6.2) and (6.3) yields (4).  The 
first equation shows how the composition of growth and population shifts impact on urban poverty; 9 
 
the second shows how they impact on rural poverty.  The third equation gives the impact on the 
population shift component of  P log  .  We estimate (6.1) and (6.2).
19   
3. Data 
In addressing the questions posed in the Introduction, it is clearly desirable to have a 
reasonable long time series of household surveys; a short series can be deceptive for inferring a 
trend.
20 Amongst developing countries, India has the longest series of national household 
surveys suitable for tracking living conditions of the poor.  At the time of writing, we can 
assemble distributional data on household consumption in India from 47 surveys spanning 1951-
2006, though some of the earliest surveys had smaller sample sizes and covered shorter periods.  
However, the surveys are large enough to be considered representative at the urban and rural 
levels as well as nationally, and they appear to be reasonably comparable over time since the 
basic survey instruments and methods have changed rather little (though we note, and address, 
some comparability problems).  India thus provides rich time series evidence for testing and 
quantifying the relationship between living standards of the poor and macroeconomic 
aggregates.  
The period of analysis in Ravallion and Datt (1996) ended only two years after India’s 
process of economic reform had started. This paper updates Ravallion and Datt (1996) by 
incorporating an extra 14 rounds of the National Sample Surveys (NSS).  The data are not, of 
course, ideal. Imperfect matching between the survey periods and the annual accounting periods 
used in the national accounts makes it harder to detect the true effect of aggregate growth on 
poverty. There are also long-standing concerns about the rising gap between aggregate 
household consumption as measured from the NSS and the “private consumption” component of 
domestic absorption in the national accounts (NAS). New problems also emerge in the post-1991 
period, including changes in survey design that we address later.  
Notwithstanding these issues, we believe there is now sufficient data for the “post-
reform” period to revisit the question of whether India’s higher growth rates have delivered the 
                                                 
19   Equation (6.3) need not be estimated separately since the parameters can be inferred from the 
estimates of (6.1) and (6.2) and (4) using the adding-up restriction.  
20   For example, the first survey (1992) available in the post-reform period indicated a substantial 
increase in poverty and this fuelled much debate about the wisdom of reforms. We questioned this 
inference at the time arguing that the 1992 survey was deceptive about trends (Datt and Ravallion, 1997). 10 
 
promise of a higher rate of progress against poverty. Attribution to reforms per se is clearly 
problematic. However, revisiting our earlier findings with these new data offers at least a clue as 
to whether the reform process has accelerated, or decelerated, India’s progress against poverty. 
We also use these data revisit the results on the urban-rural composition of growth from 
Ravallion and Datt (1996) in the light of the extra 15 years of data for the post-reform period. 
For the purpose of this study, we have derived a new and consistent time series of 
poverty measures for rural and urban India over the period 1951 to 2006.  This is based on 
consumption distributions from 47 household surveys conducted by the National Sample Survey 
Organization (NSSO); beginning with the 3rd round for August to November 1951, we use 
distributions up to the 62nd round for 2005/06.  This series significantly improves upon the most 
widely-used time series on poverty measures in India to date.
21  The pre-1991 data also differ in 
some respects to the data set we constructed in Ravallion and Datt (1996), as noted below.  
  Some of the early NSS rounds (in particular rounds 4 to 12) had survey periods that were 
considerably shorter than a year.  We opted to aggregate some of these rounds to broadly 
conform to a year-long survey period.  The estimates for rounds 4 and 5, 6 and 7, 9 and 10, and 
rounds 11 and 12 were thus pair-wise aggregated using the number of survey months covered by 
the round as weights.  For instance, the headcount index for combined rounds 6 (for May-
September 1953) and 7 (for October 1953-March 1954) is 5/11-th of the headcount index for 
round 6 plus 6/11-th of the headcount index for round 7.  Thus, with these combined rounds, for 
the full period from 1951 to 2006 our data set has 43 observations.      
  Following now well-established practice for India and elsewhere, a household's standard 
of living is measured by real consumption expenditure per person.  The underlying NSS data do 
not include incomes, though it can be argued that current consumption is a better indicator of 
living standards than current income.  Nonetheless, there are various "non-income" dimensions 
of well-being that this measure cannot hope to capture, and we say nothing here about how 
responsive these other dimensions may be to growth.  
  While the NSS surveys are highly comparable over time by international standards, there 
is a comparability problem in the rounds since the early 1990s. While most of the surveys have 
                                                 
21   Prior to Ravallion and Datt (1996), past work on poverty and growth in India had relied on poverty 
measures presented in Ahluwalia (1978) giving estimates of poverty measures for rural areas only for 12 
rounds spanning 1956-57 to 1973-74. This was extended to add one round (1977-78) in Ahluwalia (1985). 11 
 
used a uniform recall period of 30 days for all consumption items, seven of the survey rounds 
over this period have used instead a mixed-recall period (MRP), with shorter (one week) recall 
for some items (for food in the 55
th round) and longer (one year) for others (mainly non-food 
items).
22 On a preliminary investigation of the data we found that the use of a mixed recall 
period reduced the log of the headcount index at a given level of mean consumption by about 0.2 
and the effect is (highly) significant.
23 All our regressions include a control for MRP survey 
rounds.    
We use the NSSO’s urban-rural classification.
24  Over such a long period, some rural 
areas would have become urban areas.  To the extent that rural (non-farm) economic growth may 
help create such re-classifications, as successful villages evolve into towns, this process may 
produce a downward bias in our estimates of the (absolute) elasticities of rural poverty to rural 
economic growth.  The impact on the urban elasticities could go either way, depending on the 
circumstances of new urban areas relative to the old ones.  We have little choice but to use the 
NSSO's classification, given that the unit record data are unavailable for the full period covered 
by this exercise.  But nor is it clear what the best corrective would be with access to that data.  
Figure 2 gives the urban share of total consumption in the NSS data, which has risen 
steadily since about 1960. The increase clearly predates the reform period, but the share has 
increased appreciably since the 1980s.   
The poverty line is based on the line defined by the Planning Commission (1979), and 
endorsed by Planning Commission (1993). This is based on a nutritional norm of 2,400 calories 
per person per day in rural areas and 2,100 calories for urban areas. The poverty lines for rural 
and urban sectors were defined as the level of average per capita total expenditure at which these 
caloric norms were typically attained. The rural poverty line was thus determined at a per capita 
monthly expenditure of Rs. 49, and the urban at Rs. 57 at 1973-74 prices. 
                                                 
22   Mixed reference periods have been used for rounds 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60 and 62.  
23   Regressing the change in the log of the headcount index across 42 rounds on the change in the log 
of the survey mean and the change in a dummy variable for MRP rounds, the latter had a regression 
coefficient of -0.20 with a t-ratio of 16.7. Similarly, MRP rounds tended to yield significantly lower 
inequality (as measured by the Gini index) in both rural and urban areas. 
24   The NSS has followed the Census definition of urban areas which is based on a number of criteria 
including a population greater than 5000, a density not less than 400 persons per sq. km. and three-fourths of 
the male workers engaged in non-agricultural pursuits. 
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  For the urban sector after August 1968, the all-India Consumer Price Index for Industrial 
Workers (CPIIW) is used as the deflator.  For the earlier period, the Labour Bureau's Consumer 
Price Index for the Working Class is used, which is an earlier incarnation of the CPIIW albeit 
with a smaller coverage of urban centers (27 against 50).  The rural cost of living index series 
was constructed in three parts.  For the period since September 1964, the rural cost of living 
index is the all-India Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Laborers (CPIAL) published by the 
Labour Bureau.  For the period September 1956 to August 1964 (for which an all-India CPIAL 
does not exist), a monthly series of the all-India CPIAL was constructed as a weighted average 
of the state-level CPIALs, using the same state-level weights as those used in the all-India 
CPIAL published since September 1964.  For the initial period August 1951 to August 1956, 
forecasts were obtained from a dynamic model of the CPIAL as a function of the CPIIW and the 
Wholesale Price Index (see Datt, 1997, for details).   
Our CPIAL series also dealt with a problem to do with the fact that the Labour Bureau 
used the same price of firewood in its published series since 1960-61.  Firewood is typically a 
common property resource for agricultural laborers, but it is also a market good, and so the 
Labour Bureau's practice is questionable.  Our CPIAL series corrects this by replacing the 
firewood sub-series in the CPIAL by one based on mean rural firewood prices (only available 
from 1970) and a series assuming that firewood prices increased at the same rate as all other 
items in the Fuel and Light category (prior to 1970).  This correction to the CPIAL series is 
made for the period up to the 51
st round for July 1994-June 1995 when the Labor Bureau re-
based the series using a revised weighting diagram.  The final CPIIW and CPIAL indices are 
averages of monthly indices corresponding to the exact survey period of each of the NSSO's 
rounds.  
Our price indices also take account of an issue that has recently been raised in 
discussions of how the measurement of price trends influences the estimation of poverty in India 
(Deaton, 2007).  It has been argued that the overall weight of food in the CPIAL is too large such 
that a rise (fall) in the relative price of food results is an overestimation (underestimation) of the 
rate of inflation.  Potentially, the same problem also arises for the CPIIW.  Hence, to deal with 
this issue we reweight the food and non-food components of the CPIAL (and CPIIW) for any 
round by the predicted food and the non-food shares for the rural (and urban) poor in the 13 
 
preceding round, starting with round 15 for July 1959-June 1960 (and using the predicted food 
share for the poor from round 14 for July 1958-June 1959).
25  The reweighted indices for 
successive rounds are then combined to form chain price indices which give our preferred 
measures of inflation in rural and urban areas corresponding to the evolving food and non-food 
budget shares of the poor.   
  The population numbers are from the censuses and assume a constant growth rate 
between censuses. They are also centered at the mid-points of the NSSO’s survey periods. The 
trend increase in the urban population share was 0.24 percentage points per year in the period 
1951 to 2005-6 (with a robust standard error of 0.04). In the 40 years after 1950, the urban 
sector’s population share rose from 17% to 26%, and by 2005 it rose to 29%. 
  We use private final consumption expenditure and net domestic product from the NAS. 
To mesh the NAS data with the poverty data from the NSSO, we have linearly interpolated the 
annual national accounts data to the mid-point of the survey period for different rounds.  We 
follow Ravallion and Datt (1996) in only using both NAS and NSS data in the same regressions 
for the period 1958 onwards, given the poor mapping between NSS rounds and NAS annual data 
prior to 1958 in view of the shorter survey periods of the early rounds. 
While our use of household surveys, such as the NSS, in measuring poverty is standard 
practice, it has been questioned by some observers. Bhalla (2002), in particular, has argued that 
the NSS underestimates consumption levels, leading to an overestimation of the level of poverty 
in India and underestimation of the pace of poverty reduction. The main reason given is the large 
and rising gap between the measure of aggregate household consumption implied by the NSS 
and the estimate of private consumption that can be derived from India’s national accounts 
(NAS). The gap is unusually large for India. The NSS data suggest a consumption aggregate that 
is only about half of the household consumption component of the NAS.   
Figure 3 plots consumption per person from the NSS (urban and rural) and the private 
consumption component of the national accounts, also per person, and mapped into NSS rounds. 
                                                 
25   Predicted food shares are derived from grouped data on budget shares, using a regression for the 
previous round of food budget shares as a cubic function of the cumulative proportion of the population 
ranked by per capita monthly total expenditure.  Food shares for the poor for the current round were then 
predicted at the estimated headcount index for the previous round.  In the case of MRP survey rounds, the 
regression for the most recent round with a uniform recall period was used. 
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From the point of view of the present discussion, it is notable that the NSS series does not reflect 
fully the gains in mean consumption indicated by the NAS from the early 1990s onwards. Upon 
regressing consumption growth from the NSS on that from the NAS, with controls for changes in 
whether the round used MRP and changes in the log ratio of rural price index to the National 
Accounts deflator, the overall elasticity of the NSS mean consumption to NAS consumption is 
0.48 (t=4.03).  The elasticity is significantly less than unity. The elasticity is also lower in the 
post-1991 period, declining to 0.45 (t=3.29) from 0.57 (4.47) in the pre-1991 period.  However, 
one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the elasticities for the two sub-periods are the same.  
To investigate further the source of divergence between NAS and NSS consumption in the two 
sub-periods, we also regressed the difference between NAS and NSS mean consumption growth 
rates on dummy variables for pre-1991 and post-1991 sub-periods, and on pre- and post-1991 per 
capita net domestic product (NDP) growth rates. (All regressions include controls for change in 
dummy variable for an MRP round as well as change in the log ratio of rural price index to the 
NA deflator.) These tests confirmed that the divergence in the NAS and NSS mean consumption 
growth rates has been greater in the post-1991 period, although the difference between the two 
sub-periods is not statistically significant. We also found that the divergence between NAS and 
NSS mean consumption growth rates tends to be higher the higher the per capita NDP growth 
rate, and this association between NAS-NSS divergence and per capita income growth is 
somewhat stronger in the post-1991 period.   
We do not know what role NSS survey methods have played in this divergence from 
NAS consumption. By international standards, the NSSO’s methods appear to have changed 
rather little over many decades. That is probably good news for comparability reasons, although 
it does raise questions about whether their methods are in accord with international best practice. 
This is something that should be reviewed in the future, in the light of international experience.  
However, it is notable that the MRP rounds of the NSS have helped close the gap between the 
NAS and NSS consumption aggregates. Regressing the log difference of the NSS mean on the 
log difference of NAS consumption and the change in the dummy variable for MRP rounds, the 
latter variable has a coefficient of 0.055 (t=4.14). This suggests that NSS design may account for 
at least some of the discrepancy between the two data sources.    15 
 
However, it is also important to note that the gap between the consumption aggregates 
from these two sources does not imply that the NSS overestimates poverty. Some of the gap is 
due to errors in NAS consumption, which is determined residually in India, after subtracting 
other components of domestic absorption from output at the commodity level. There are also 
differences in the definition of consumption, and there are things included in NAS consumption 
that should not be in a measure of household living standards.
26 Some degree of under-reporting 
of consumption by respondents, or selective compliance with the NSS’s randomized 
assignments, is inevitable. However, it is expected that this is more of a problem for estimating 
consumption by the rich than the poor.
27 While we cannot rule out the possibility that such 
problems lead us to overestimate poverty in India—and an external review of the procedures 
used by the NSS, in the light of international best practice, is called for in our view—it is hard to 
justify the practice used by some analysts of replacing the mean from the NSS by consumption 
per capita from the NAS, while assuming that inequality is correctly measured by the NSS. 
For the for the same reason that the consumption aggregates from the NSS are diverging 
from the private consumption component of domestic absorption as estimated by the NAS, one 
cannot rule out the possibility that the increase in inequality in India is being underestimated by 
the NSS. That depends on why we are seeing the divergence between NSS and NAS aggregates; 
if it stems from a failure of the surveys to fully capture the rising consumptions of the rich then it 
is not clear that there will be much bias in the poverty measures based on the surveys.
28   
 
4. Results 
  We begin with an overview of the trends in the variables of interest, both for the 50 year 
period and the periods before and after 1991. We then present the estimated growth elasticities of 
poverty reduction, also looking separately at urban and rural areas and their interaction.  
Trends over time 
                                                 
26   For further discussion of the differences between the two data sources see Sundaram and 
Tendulkar (2001), Ravallion (2000, 2003), Sen (2005) and Deaton (2005). 
 
27   There is evidence from other sources consistent with that expectation; see Banerjee and Piketty 
(2006) on income under-reporting by India’s rich. 
28   For a more complete discussion of this issue see Korinek et al. (2006). 16 
 
There cannot be any doubt that growth has picked up in the post-reform period. The trend 
rate of growth in India’s NDP per capita in the period 1958-1991 was 1.63% (with a robust 
standard error of 0.06%) while it was and 4.28% (0.18%) in the period 1992-2006 (Table 1).
29 
Similarly, the rate of growth of private consumption per capita from the national accounts also 
increased 1.21% per annum in the first period to 3.13% in the second. The acceleration in the 
survey-based per capita consumption growth—though less than that in mean income or 
consumption from the national accounts—is also significant, from 0.68% per annum in the pre-
1991 period to 1.33% in the post-1991 period. Looking at the composition of output by sectors, 
the highest growth rates in the period after 1991 has been in the tertiary sector (primarily 
services and trade), followed closely by the secondary (manufacturing) sector, while agriculture 
has continued to lag. Compared to the pre-reform period, the sector that gained the most was 
services, while agricultural growth rates showed little or no improvement (Chaudhuri and 
Ravallion, 2006).The main long-run structural shift in India’s economy has been out of 
agriculture into services, and this continued after 1991. 
  Turning to the poverty measures, Figure 6 gives the headcount index and squared poverty 
gap for both urban and rural sectors.  There was neither a trend increase nor decrease in rural 
poverty until about 1970, when a trend decrease emerged; sustained, though uneven, progress 
against poverty had clearly emerged in India prior to the economic reforms starting in the early 
1990s.  Co-movement is strong between the urban and rural measures and there is a clear 
indication of a declining absolute difference between the poverty measures for urban and rural 
areas after about 1970.
30  Indeed, the urban SPG overtakes the rural index by the end of the 
period. In common with other developing countries (Ravallion et al., 2007) poverty has been 
urbanizing over time, with a rising share of the poor living in urban areas. In the early 1950s, 
only about 15% of India’s poor lived in urban areas, but this had risen to about 28% in 2005-6. 
However, given that more than 70% of the population is still in rural areas, the rural sector 
                                                 
29   These are based on regressions of log NDP per capita on time. Here and elsewhere we follow 
Boyce (1986) in estimating the two growth rates as parameters of a single regression, constrained to 
assure that the predicted values were equal in 1992 (to avoid an implausible discontinuity). 
30   The regression coefficient of rural H minus urban H on time after 1970 is -0.231% points per year 
(t-ratio=-4.617); for SPG it is -0.062 (t=-9.545).  
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accounts for the bulk of national poverty at the end of the period—72% of the total number of 
poor, 68% of the aggregate poverty gap and 65% of the aggregate squared poverty gap. 
  Table 1 also gives the growth rates of the poverty measures. Over the 50-year period, the 
exponential trend—the regression coefficient of the log poverty measure on time—was 1.3% per 
annum for H, rising to 2.2% and 3.0% for PG and SPG respectively. For the period prior to 1991, 
the trends were 1.1%, 2.1% and 2.8% for H, PG and SPG, while the corresponding post-reform 
trends were 2.4%, 3.4% and 4.2%.  So we find higher exponential trends in poverty reduction the 
post-reform period. However, the difference between the pre- and post-1991 trends can only be 
considered statistically significant for the headcount index and then only at about the 8% level.  
  Alternatively one might prefer to define the trend in the level of the poverty measure or 
mean consumption/income rather than its log. This again confirms the same finding of an 
acceleration of growth (in mean income and consumption) in the post-1991 period, but yields no 
evidence of a parallel acceleration in poverty reduction; see bottom panel of Table 1.   
Growth and poverty trends in urban and rural areas reveal a pattern that is similar to the 
national level.  While the (survey-based) mean consumption growth rates are higher (nearly 
twice as high) in the post-1991 period than pre-1991 in both rural and urban areas, only the 
acceleration in urban growth is statistically significant (Table 2).  There are some indications of 
a faster poverty decline post-1991, more notably in rural areas, but the increase is often not 
statistically significant.  For instance, there is no significant acceleration in the trend decline in 
PG or SPG in either rural or urban areas.  Only for the headcount index is the increase in the 
trend rate of poverty decline significant—at the 10% level in rural areas, and at the 3% level in 
urban areas.   
Given that an important link in the argument for reform is that it would make India’s 
growth more labor intensive, it is of interest to see what has happened to employment growth. 
The first large survey of employment by the NSSO after 1991 (for 1999-00) suggested a slight 
slow-down in the rate of growth of employment, although the latest available NSSO for 2004-05 
suggests that the employment growth rate in the period 1993-94 to 2004-05 has been virtually 
the same as the preceding 10 years (Panagariya, 2008, p.146). These comparisons are clouded 
somewhat by the fact that a large share of employment is in the informal sector, for which 18 
 
reliable measurement is more difficult, and that the reforms themselves may well induce output 
and employment to shift to the informal sector.   
A part of the reason why the faster post-reform growth has not yielded comparably 
higher rates of poverty reduction is that this higher overall growth has been accompanied by a 
rise in inequality. As in any developing country, the gap between urban and rural living 
standards is an important dimension of overall inequality. The urban mean has risen over time 
relative to the rural mean. The trend rate of growth in mean consumption based on the NSS since 
1958 has been 0.87% per annum (standard error of 0.10%) for urban areas versus 0.65% 
(standard error of 0.14%) for rural areas.
31 Figure 4 plots the ratio of urban mean consumption to 
the rural mean over time, which rose from 1.15 around 1960 to 1.30 around 2000. Fitting a linear 
trend to the post-1958 series in Figure 4 implies that the ratio increases by 0.03 per 10 years, and 
this is significant at the 1% level (t=4.01; n=37). So inequality increased between urban and rural 
areas.  
What has happened to inequality within urban and rural areas separately? The Gini 
indices calculated from the relevant NSS rounds, but without an adjustment for the difference 
between the uniform versus mixed recall period, suggest that inequality within rural areas has 
tended to decline while that within urban areas declined up to about 1980 with a tendency to 
increase thereafter (Figure 5). However, this is no longer true once we control for the mixed 
reference periods of the several NSS rounds since the 1990s, which have a dampening effect on 
measured inequality; as can be seen in Figure 5, which also gives the predicted values when we 
control for the differences between surveys in their recall periods. We find evidence of an 
increase in inequality within both rural and urban areas after 1991, with a clear rising trend 
emerging in the post-1991 period (upon controlling for the influence of mixed reference period 
in several of the post-1991 rounds), which replaced a flat inequality level in urban areas and a 
declining trend in rural areas during the earlier (pre-1991) period (see Table 2 and Figure 5).   
Growth elasticities of poverty reduction 
Table 3 gives our estimates of the elasticities of all three poverty measures with respect 
to: (i) consumption per person from the NSS; (ii) consumption per person as estimated by the 
                                                 
31   The rural mean was rising relative to the urban mean during most of the 1950s (Figure 1). We 
exclude this period from the calculation since it is so unusual. 19 
 
NAS and population census; and (iii) Net Domestic Product (NDP; "income" for short) per 
person, also from the NAS and census. In all cases, the elasticities are estimated by regressing 
the log poverty measure on the log mean consumption or income.  We also give an "adjusted" 
estimate in which a control variable was added for the first difference of the log of the ratio of 
the consumer price index for agricultural laborers to the national income deflator (i.e., the 
difference in the rate of inflation implied by the two deflators).  This was included to allow for 
possible bias in estimating the growth elasticity due to the difference in the deflator used for the 
national accounts data and that used for the poverty lines.   
For 1958-2006 as a whole, the national poverty measures responded significantly to all 
three measures.  This also holds when we use lagged survey means and national accounts and 
price data as instruments for the current survey mean, in an attempt to reduce the potential for 
spurious correlation due to common survey measurement errors.  The (absolute) elasticities are 
higher if one uses the NSS estimate of mean consumption, rather than the national accounts 
estimate.  The elasticities are lowest for per capita income.  This may be due to inter-temporal 
consumption smoothing, which may make poverty (in terms of consumption) less responsive in 
the short-term to income growth than to consumption growth. Imperfect matching of the time 
periods between the NSS and the NAS could also be playing a role in attenuating the elasticities 
using NAS growth rates.  But probably the most important reason for lower (absolute) 
elasticities with respect to NAS consumption or income has to do with the increasing divergence 















         ( 7 )  
An elasticity of   w.r.t. C (NAS consumption per capita) of around 0.5 (Section 3) would yield 
a poverty elasticity w.r.t.   that is about double that w.r.t. C—roughly in accord with Table 3.       
When we split the period into two at 1991, we find an appreciably higher (absolute) 
elasticity of the headcount index with respect to the survey mean in the post-1991 period; the 
difference in the estimated elasticities (1.58 and 2.07 respectively for the two periods) is 
statistically significant.
32 However, for the poverty gap measures, the difference in the 
                                                 
32   See Table 3.  These results are based on regressions of log poverty measures on log survey mean 
interacted with dummy variables for pre- and post-1991 periods, and a dummy variable for MRP surveys. 20 
 
elasticities for the two periods is much smaller (2.63 and 2.94 respectively) and is not 
statistically significant.  Finally, for the squared poverty gap measure, the elasticities are the 
same for the two periods (about 3.48).  The pattern is similar when we use our IVE method to 
control for correlated measurement errors, however the difference between the two periods is 
narrower, and for the squared poverty gap measure the post-91 elasticity of 3.28 is in fact lower 
that the pre-91 elasticity of 3.52.  The vanishing difference in post- and pre-91 elasticities for the 
higher-order measures of poverty is consistent with the increase in inequality during the latter 
period.    
  As a check on the internal consistence of our estimates, the estimated elasticities of 
poverty measures with respect to survey mean can be multiplied with the trend growth rates of 
survey mean to yield an estimate of the trend rates of decline in poverty measures. Table 4 
reports the results of this calculation, which indicate that the trends in poverty measures 
estimated by using the elasticities track the actual trends in poverty measures reasonably well.   
In contrast to the growth rates based on the survey means, we find that both NAS-based 
growth rates indicate lower (absolute) elasticities in the post-1991 period, although the 
difference between the two periods is generally not statistically significant; the exceptions to this 
pattern are for the “unadjusted” elasticities of PG and SPG which are significantly lower in the 
post-reform period.  It is nevertheless notable how much difference there is in the elasticity 
based on the NSS consumption growth rates versus the NAS rates for the post-1991 period.  The 
much lower NAS elasticities are reflective of the much faster NAS-based growth relative to that 
based on the NSS. Since the NAS-NSS growth divergence is more pronounced post-91, for the 
PG and SPG measures it even yields lower (absolute) elasticities for this period relative to the 
pre-91 period.  
  We also estimated the semi-elasticities, from the regression of  t P on  t ln . We found that 
the poverty impact of growth in the survey mean is lower in the post-91 period.  The estimated 
semi-elasticities for the post-1991 period were -0.73 (t=-45.8) for H, -0.34 (t=-32.3) for PG, and -
0.17 (t=-25.3) for SPG as compared with -0.63 (t=-15.7), -0.20 (t=-9.82) and -0.08 (t=-7.24) 
respectively in the pre-91 period.  
                                                                                                                                                             
The regressions also incorporate a kink at NSS round 47 (July-December 1991) such that there is no 
discontinuity in the predicted values of log poverty measures between the pre- and post-1991 periods.  21 
 
  To summarize: the responsiveness of poverty to growth when measured from the surveys 
has generally remained the same across the pre- and post-reform periods, while there are signs that 
the responsiveness to growth measured through the national accounts has declined during the post-
reform period.  This seems to be largely the product of the faster post-reform growth not being 
fully reflected in the surveys, and the increase in inequalities during the post-reform period.   
Urban-rural composition of consumption growth 
Table 5 summarizes the results in testing the poverty impact of the urban-rural 
composition of consumption growth.  Table 6 gives the test statistics on whether the urban-rural 
composition of growth matters and whether the population shift effect is significant.  These 
results on the relative effects of urban-rural growth are presented for national poverty measures 
as well as separately for urban and rural areas.   
For the pre-1991 period, the hypothesis that it is only the overall rate of growth that 
matters for poverty reduction is strongly rejected (Table 6).  The weaker hypothesis of uniform 
poverty effects of urban and rural growth is also strongly rejected.  This echoes the results from 
Ravallion and Datt (1996).  Thus, we confirm our earlier finding that the growth effects on 
poverty for pre-1991 are largely attributable to rural consumption growth, with virtually no 
contribution from urban growth and a only limited contribution from the Kuznets process.  
  However, there is a significant structural shift between the pre-91 and post-91 periods.  
The hypothesis of similar growth effects during the two-periods is rejected (at the 8% level of 
significance or better; see Table 5).  In the post-1991 period, the rural growth rate remains 
significant for poverty reduction (with the possible exception of the squared poverty gap 
measure) though the growth effects are smaller in absolute terms.  Unlike the pre-1991 period, 
rural growth does not appear to be the prime driver of national poverty reduction.  The most 
notable change is that the (share-weighted) urban growth variable is now highly significant. We 
can also mostly reject the null that only the overall growth rate matters for poverty reduction in 
the post-1991 period (Table 6), although the evidence for a Kuznetz effect during this period is 
weaker and only limited to the headcount index of poverty.   
The emergence of a significant effect of urban growth on national poverty is the most 
striking feature of the post-reform economic growth in India.  Table 7 reports the elasticities of 
national H, PG, and SPG measures with respect to urban and rural growth.  The contrast between 22 
 
the pre-1991 and post-1991 periods is compelling.  While pre-1991 urban growth did not seem to 
matter for national poverty reduction, after 1991 not only did a significant urban growth effect 
emerge, but the urban growth elasticities of all three national poverty measures were higher (in 
absolute terms) than the corresponding elasticities with respect to rural growth.    
The urban-rural decomposition of the rate of poverty reduction reveals something about 
the source of the evident structural break between the pre- and post-reform periods.  The 
hypothesis of no structural change is rejected for measures of depth and severity of poverty in 
urban areas, but only for the headcount index in rural areas.  However, for rural PG and SPG too, 
the hypothesis of similar effects of urban growth for the two sub-periods is rejected.   
For the pre-1991 phase, we find that urban growth reduced urban poverty (Table 5), but 
so too did rural growth, which had a significant impact on poverty in both sectors for all three 
poverty measures.  Indeed, for SPG, the (absolute) elasticity of urban poverty to rural growth 
(0.77) is virtually the same as it is to urban growth (0.78); see Table 7.  The effect of urban 
growth, which for this period is confined to urban poverty, appears to be too small to be detected 
in the national average poverty measures in the pre-1991 period. 
  The data for the post-1991 period look very different. Now we find that the urban-
economic growth not only reduced urban poverty (as it did before), but had a positive feedback 
effects on rural poverty, especially the rural headcount index.  Indeed, the estimated elasticities 
of rural poverty measures with respect to urban growth are even higher than those with respect to 
rural growth. On the other hand, rural economic growth remains important to rural poverty 
reduction (in particular for the incidence and depth of rural poverty), but its spillover effect to 
the urban poor has become considerably weaker in the post-1991 period for H and PG, though it 
remains strong for SPG, suggestive of a continuing (positive) distributional effect in urban areas 
of rural economic expansion (Table 7).   
  Figure 7 shows the estimated impact of urban economic growth in both the pre-1991 and 
post-1991 periods. For each period, the figure plots the change in log national headcount index 
that remains unexplained by rural growth against the change in log urban mean consumption. We 
see that there was no significant poverty-reducing effect of growth in mean urban consumption 
in the pre-1991 period, but a significant impact emerges after 1991.  23 
 
  It can be seen from Tables 3-7 that our qualitative results are generally robust to the 
choice of poverty measure.  Similarly to Ravallion and Datt (1996), the growth elasticities tend 
to be highest (in absolute value) for SPG and higher for PG than H.  As we show in the 1996 
paper, the higher growth elasticity of PG than H implies that the depth of poverty (as measured by 
the mean poverty gap relative to the poverty line) is also reduced by growth.  Similarly, the even 
higher elasticity of SPG implies that inequality amongst the poor (as measured by the coefficient 
of variation) is reduced by growth.  Thus the impacts of growth within and between sectors are 
not confined to households in a neighborhood of the poverty line. 
There are two notable exceptions to this pattern. The first is found in the pre-1991 data 
for urban areas, where we find a slightly lower elasticity for SPG than PG in the effects of urban 
growth on urban poverty (Table 7). This is suggestive of underlying adverse distributional 
effects amongst the poor in the urban economic growth process of the pre-reform period. The 
second exception is in the impacts of rural economic growth on rural poverty in the post-1991 
period, for which we find a lower elasticity for SPG than PG in the post-1991 period (Table 7). It 
appears that an adverse distributional effect amongst the rural poor has emerged in the rural 
growth process of the pre-reform period. 
Compared to our earlier findings, the most striking new result is the evidence that the 
urban economic growth process since 1991 has been appreciably more effective in reducing rural 
(and national) poverty.  Since the regressions for rural poverty include rural mean consumption, 
the urban growth effect can be interpreted as a distributional effect.  Evidence in support of such 
a distributional effect is provided by the following regression of changes in the rural log Gini 
index (G) of inequality on the (share-weighted) urban and rural growth rates:
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It can be seen that, unlike the pre-1991 period, higher growth rates of mean urban consumption 
since 1991 have reduced inequality within rural areas (significant at the 10% level).  Rural 
consumption growth on the other hand has had the opposite effect.  
 
                                                 
33   We included the population shift effects (as in equation 6.2), but these were insignificant and are 
not reported.  The share-weighted urban and rural growth terms are instrumented as in Table 5.   24 
 
5. Conclusions 
  We have studied a new time series of survey-based poverty measures for urban and rural 
India spanning 50 years, including 15 years after economic reforms started in earnest in the early 
1990s. While progress against poverty has been highly uneven over time, we find a long-run 
trend decline in all three of the poverty measures we have used. Exponential (proportionate) 
trends are higher for the poverty gap and squared poverty gap indices than the headcount index, 
reflecting gains to those living well below the poverty line. Both urban and rural poverty 
measures have shown a trend decline; rural poverty measures have historically been higher than 
for urban areas, though the urban and rural poverty measures have been converging over time, 
and in recent years the squared poverty gap index for urban India has started to exceed that for 
rural India.     
Progress against poverty has been maintained in the post-reform period. Indeed, we find a 
higher proportionate rate of progress against poverty after 1991, although the difference in trend 
rates of change between the two periods is only statistically significant for the headcount index. 
The linear trend—the annual percentage point reduction in the poverty measures—has remained 
about the same in the post-reform period. We also find that the responsiveness of poverty to 
growth in the survey mean—the growth elasticity of poverty reduction—has generally remained 
the same between the two periods; only for the headcount index do we find a significant increase 
in the absolute growth elasticity in the post-reform period. When we use growth as measured in 
the national accounts there are signs that the post-reform growth process has become less pro-
poor in the sense of attaining a lower proportionate rate of poverty reduction from a given rate of 
growth.  Overall, while the higher rate of growth in the post-reform period has come with a 
higher proportionate rate of progress against poverty, we do not see in these data a robust case 
for saying that the growth elasticity of poverty reduction has risen since the reforms began.  
Recognizing that the fortunes of the poor in each of the urban and rural sectors are linked 
in various ways—through trade, migration, and transfers—we have also revisited our earlier 
(pre-reform) findings on the relative importance of growth in the two sectors to poverty 
reduction in both sectors and nationally. Like our 1996 study, we find that that the pattern of 
growth matters for poverty reduction. But we find that the post-reform period has seen a striking 
change in the relative importance of urban versus rural economic growth.  Our 1996 study found 25 
 
that urban economic growth helped reduce urban poverty but brought little or no overall benefit 
to the rural poor; in fact, the main driving force for overall poverty reduction was rural economic 
growth. We confirm this finding for the data up to 1991, but the picture looks different after 
1991.  As before, urban growth reduced urban poverty, and rural growth reduced rural poverty.  
But we find much stronger evidence of a feedback effect from urban economic growth to rural 
poverty reduction than we had found in the pre-1991 data.  
The relatively weak performance of India’s agricultural sector and the widening 
disparities between urban and rural living standards remain important concerns, including for 
India’s poor.  However, it is encouraging that rising overall living standards in India’s urban 
areas in the post-reform period appear to have had significant distributional effects favoring the 
country’s rural poor.  While the attribution to the reforms is hardly conclusive—since we can 
have no comparison group, to observe India after 1991 but without the reforms—these findings 
are consistent with the view that India’s efforts to create a more open and productive market 
economy have come with a reversal in the historical pattern of weak feedback effects of urban 
economic growth on rural living standards.  
This may be a surprising conclusion given that the most dynamic sectors of India’s post-
reform economy have been more intensive in skilled than unskilled labor. However, the more 
relevant observation is that the non-farm sectors that use unskilled labor more intensively—
notably trade, construction and the “unorganized” manufacturing sectors—have seen higher 
employment growth in the post-reform period. It is a plausible conjecture that this is the main 
reason why we have found stronger spillover effect on the rural distribution of urban economic 
growth since 1991.  
This encouraging finding comes with a warning, however. While the rural poor have 
benefited more from urban economic growth in the post-reform economy, it can be expected that 
the reverse also holds: India’s rural poor will be more vulnerable in the future to urban-based 
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Table 1: Trend growth rates in national poverty measures, mean consumption and income: 
1958-2006 
 Whole  period 
1958-2006 
Pre-1991 Post-1991  Ho: pre-91 trend = 
post-91 trend  
F(1, 33) 
(Prob.) 
  Exponential trends  
Mean consumption/income:          


























Poverty measures:          


























Mean consumption/income:          




























Poverty measures:          
























Source and notes:  Authors’ calculations.  These are “least-squares growth trends” based on regressions of poverty 
measures or mean consumption/income on time.  Robust (heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent) t-
statistics are in parentheses except for the final column, which gives the prob. iIn parentheses. For estimating 
exponential trends, logs of poverty measures or mean consumption/income are used, while their levels are used for 
estimating linear trends.  In the levels case, poverty measures are in percentages, mean consumption from NSS 
surveys is constant rural prices of NSS round 14 (July 1958-June 1959), mean private consumption per capita from 
national accounts and NDP per capita are at constant 1999-2000 prices.  The trends regressions for poverty 
measures and mean NSS consumption also control for mixed reference period rounds of the NSS. The growth rates 
for pre- and post-1991 sub-periods were estimated as parameters of a single regression, constrained to assure that 
the predicted values were equal in 1992.  
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Table 2: Trend growth rates in rural and urban poverty, mean consumption and 
inequality: 1958-2006 
 
 Whole  period 
1958-2006 
Pre-1991 Post-1991  Ho: pre-91 trend = 
post-91 trend  
F(1, 33) 
(Prob.) 
  Rural (exponential trends)  
Poverty measures:          
























Mean consumption/inequality:          

















Urban (exponential trends)  
Poverty measures:          
























Mean consumption/inequality:          





















Table 3: Elasticities of national poverty measures to economic growth in India: 1958-2006 
    Elasticity of poverty measure with respect to: 






Mean net domestic 
product 
   OLS  IVE  Unadjusted  Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted 







































Ho: pre-91 elasticity  
= post-91elasticity 






















































Ho: pre-91 elasticity  
= post-91elasticity 






















































Ho: pre-91elasticity  
= post-91elasticity 














Source and notes: Authors’ calculations. Based on regressions of log poverty measures against log consumption or 
net product per person using 37 surveys spanning 1958-2006.  All regressions include a control for surveys that 
used a mixed-recall period (by adding a dummy variable for such surveys). The “adjusted” estimates control for the 
difference in the rates of inflation implied by the rural consumer price index and the national income deflator 
(Ravallion and Datt, 1996). The instrumental variables for the survey mean regressions included lagged survey 
means (split urban and rural), current and lagged mean consumption from the national accounts, current and lagged 
rural and urban consumer price indices, current and lagged rural population shares, interval between mid-points of 
survey periods and a time trend. The t-ratios in parentheses are based on heteroskedastcity and autocorrelation-34 
 
consistent standard errors.  The regressions also incorporate a kink at NSS round 47 (July-December 1991) such 
that there is no discontinuity in the predicted values of log poverty measures between the pre- and post-1991 
periods. 35 
 
Table 4: Actual and estimated rates of poverty reduction using growth elasticities of 
poverty measures: 1958-2006 







growth in survey 
mean (%) 
(2) 
Annual rate of poverty 
reduction (%) 
     
Estimated  
=(1)*(2) Actual 
Headcount index  Pre-91  -1.57  0.68  -1.07  -1.14 
Post-91 -2.07  1.33  -2.75  -2.36 
Poverty gap index  Pre-91  -2.66  0.68  -1.81  -2.06 
Post-91 -2.78  1.33  -3.70  -3.42 
Squared poverty 
gap index  Pre-91  -3.52  0.68  -2.39  -2.80 
Post-91 -3.28  1.33  -4.36  -4.23 
 
Headcount index  Full period  -1.60  0.76  -1.22  -1.29 
Poverty gap index  Full period  -2.68  0.76  -2.04  -2.23 
Squared poverty 
gap index  Full period  -3.48  0.76  -2.64  -2.98 
Source and notes:  Authors’ calculations based on Table 1 and 3.   
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Table 5: Impacts on poverty of the urban-rural composition of growth: 1951-2006 
 
Poverty 
measure   Period    National poverty  Urban poverty  Rural poverty 
         Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff.  t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio 
             
Headcount 
index 
Up to 1991  Urban growth  -0.38  -1.03  -0.64  -11.42  0.46  1.47 
Rural  growth  -1.45 -21.79  -0.08 -4.16  -1.38 -34.32 
  After 1991  Urban growth  -3.73  -2.40  -0.94  -3.47  -2.96  -2.07 
  Rural  growth  -0.98  -3.88 -0.03 -0.25  -1.01  -5.18 




















               
Poverty 
gap index 
Up to 1991  Urban growth  0.21  0.27  -0.67  -4.54  0.90  1.16 
Rural  growth  -2.19 -26.32  -0.14 -4.04  -2.06 -16.82 
  After 1991  Urban growth  -8.19  -2.79  -2.24  -3.84  -5.31  -1.88 
  Rural  growth  -1.59 -3.72 0.00 0.03 -1.59 -3.27 
























Up to 1991  Urban growth  0.47  0.44  -0.58  -3.55  1.51  1.48 
Rural  growth  -2.69 -15.27  -0.17 -4.13  -2.54 -11.80 
After 1991  Urban growth  -11.64  -2.33  -3.95  -4.77  -7.45  -1.70 
  Rural  growth  -1.66  -1.54 -0.33 -1.27  -1.19  -1.35 




















Source and notes:  Authors’ calculations.  These are the   coefficients in the regressions in equations (5) and (6) 
rather than elasticities. All regressions include a control for surveys that used a mixed-recall period (by adding the 
change between surveys in a dummy variable for such surveys).  The regressions are estimated using a 2-stage 
GMM estimator.  The instruments for the urban and rural growth variables included lagged survey means (split 
urban and rural), current and lagged mean consumption from the national accounts, current and lagged rural and 
urban consumer price indices, current and lagged rural population shares, interval between mid-points of survey 
periods and a time trend. The t-ratios are based on heteroskedastcity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors. 37 
 
Table 6: Test statistics on the significance of the pattern of growth and the Kuznets effect  
 
    Pattern of growth 
matters  
Ho:  r u     
Pattern of growth 
matters  
Ho:         n r u  
Kuznets effect 
 
Ho:  0  n   
      F(1,34)  Prob.  F(2,34)  Prob.  t ratio  Prob. 
Headcount index             
Pre-1991 National 7.55  0.01 7.31  0.00 -2.18  0.04 
 Urban  63.05  0.00  32.36  0.00  -1.32  0.20 
 Rural  32.17  0.00  22.27  0.00  -1.76  0.09 
Post-1991 National  2.55 0.12  4.06  0.03  -1.76 0.09 
 Urban  7.71  0.01  4.25  0.02  0.47  0.64 
Rural 1.60  0.21  4.85  0.01  -1.77  0.09 
Poverty gap index                    
Pre-1991 National 7.77  0.01 12.76  0.00 -3.94  0.00 
 Urban  9.38  0.00  5.63  0.01  -1.69  0.10 
 Rural  11.74  0.00  12.04  0.00  -3.33  0.00 
Post-1991 National  4.72 0.04  2.78  0.08  0.28  0.78 
 Urban  10.84  0.00  9.10  0.00  1.62  0.12 
Rural 1.56  0.22  1.24  0.30  0.25  0.81 
Squared poverty gap index                   
Pre-1991 National 6.98  0.01 8.49  0.00 -3.08  0.00 
 Urban  4.37  0.04  8.52  0.00  -3.48  0.00 
 Rural  11.74  0.00  9,74  0.00  -2.72  0.01 
Post-1991 National  3.54 0.07  1.82  0.18  0.31  0.76 
 Urban  13.56  0.00  10.09  0.00  1.68  0.01 
Rural 1.81  0.19  1.38  0.27  -0.31  0.76 
Source and notes:  Authors’ calculations.  See equations (5), (6.1), (6.2) and discussion in text. 
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Urban growth  Pre-91  -0.09  -0.85  0.13 
Rural growth  Pre-91  -1.11  -0.35  -1.29 
Urban growth  Post-91  -1.21  -1.26  -1.26 
Rural growth  Post-91  -0.66  -0.08  -0.90 
Poverty gap index         
Urban growth  Pre-91  0.05  -0.89  0.25 
Rural growth  Pre-91  -1.68  -0.61  -1.91 
Urban growth  Post-91  -2.65  -2.79  -2.32 
Rural growth  Post-91  -1.08  0.01  -1.46 
Squared poverty gap index       
Urban growth  Pre-91  0.11  -0.78  0.43 
Rural growth  Pre-91  -2.07  -0.77  -2.36 
Urban growth  Post-91  -3.77  -4.73  -3.31 
Rural growth  Post-91  -1.12  -0.83  -1.11 
Source and notes:  Authors’ calculations.  Elasticities are evaluated at means for the pre- and post-1991 periods 































































Source: Author’s estimates using the data and methods described in section 3.  
 
 
Figure 2: Urban share of total consumption, 1951-2006 (%) 
 





Figure 3: Average consumption in India, 1951-2006 
 
Source and notes: Authors’ calculations.  
Mean consumption refers to per capita monthly consumption in Rs. at constant 1958-9  
(Round 14) prices. 
 
 
Figure 4: Ratio of urban mean consumption to rural mean consumption, India 1951-2006 
 
 
              Note: Fitted values are a 4




Figure 5: Trends in urban and rural inequality, 1951-2006, controlling for  
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Year
 
Source and notes: Authors’ calculations.  The lines show predicted Gini indices after controlling for  
the effect of MRP rounds (as distinct from predicted values without controls).   
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Figure 6: Poverty measures for India, 1951-2006 
 
Headcount index (%) 
   
 
Squared poverty gap index (%) 
 


































































-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
































































-.05 0 .05 .1
Change in log urban mean
Post-1991
Source and notes: Authors’ calculations.  The shaded area shows the 95% confidence interval.   